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The Meeting of Muslim and Christian
Kenneth Cragg
In 1948 in Algiers there appeared a French novel by Malek Bennabi,
one of the most articulate of Algerian Muslim writers. It concerned the
conversion to the state of Islamic ‘Falah’ or good-in life, of a drunkard youth
from Bone in Algeria, where the story opened. Pilgrims from the Maghreb
had gathered in the seaport and the boat for Mecca was leaving on the
morrow. The harbor-town had been busy with farewells and a festive air
hung over the evening. Those not fortunate enough to go on pilgrimage
had petitioned the happy ones to remember them at the well of Zamzam.
Brahim, the hero of the story, had been oblivious of these pious aspirations
all around him. He staggered home at midnight -- drunk as usual. Unable
in his stupefaction to turn the key in the lock, Brahim had roused his uncle
Muhammad in the midst of the night prayers. Remonstrating with his
nephew, as often before, the uncle recalled the pious parents of the youth
whose memory was now so wantonly desecrated.
Mumbling that his lot was ‘Maktüb’ Brahim stumbled to his bed
and fell into a heavy sleep. But in the early morning he awoke after a
dream of the Ka’bah where he had seen himself in the Ihräm garment of
the pilgrim throngs. In a reverie he surveys his past life -- the drunken
charcoal-seller of Bone. Into his reflections breaks the raucous Hayyä’
alä-l-Fälah of the morning muezzin. “Come ye unto the good,” Brahim
impulsively decides to go to the mosque and in his unaccustomed prayers
he resolves to make the pilgrimage. Since the boat is to leave that very
afternoon rapid action is called for. But uncle Muhammad, overjoyed at
the strange turn of events, aids him with the necessary papers and the
sudden resolve becomes a reality.
Bennabi describes life aboard the pilgrim ship with insight. But his
main theme is the regeneration of a soul, Brahim befriends a street urchin
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who has stowed away on the ship and his solicitude for this lad plays a
part in his own transformation. After the pilgrimage Brahim decides to
stay in Medina, where the story leaves him as a cafe-waiter reconciled
with his former wife, who had divorced him for his drunkenness, but who
now comes to the Prophet’ s city to rejoin him. The title of the novel,
significantly, is Labbaika, the word with which the pilgrim repeatedly
announces his advent to the Haramain, “Here I am before thee O God,”
The study behind the title is a study of a man’s reclamation by the good to
which, in God, Islam bears witness.
We begin with Bennabi only to leave him at once. Our purpose
is not to evaluate his thinking, nor to suggest that Brahim’ s remaining
in Medina is perhaps regrettable if Bone is where he lived in wrong. Nor
do we want here to explore the question whether the novel does not
suggest somehow that it is easy to be good or that a man’s retrieval need
not involve redemption. The sole purpose in using Bennabi here at the
outset of our theme is the assurance his novel provides that the things
the Christian Gospel means and says have an immediate relevance to
universal man. Indeed that there is a commonness about humanity and
that the significance of the Gospel is an inclusive significance, since it is
about precisely those things which are the burden of all existence and the
ultimate concern of all religion.
These truths may sound trite and indisputable. Yet such has been
the general course of Muslim-Christian relations that it is often this very
confidence in the relevance of the Christian thing to the Muslim best
which has been doubted or obscured. The encounter has too often looked
like an academic barter, or banter, of competitive metaphysical systems
or a kind of abstruse theological exchange of total alternatives where we
have seemingly conceived that what we had to gain was a debating victory,
rather than a spiritual awakening and that we had to work against rather
than through Islamic concepts. Because, however, of the long legacy of
Muslim-Christian relations it is good that we should be fortified at the
beginning with the realization that beneath all that may have seemed barren
and tedious there abides a real and an attainable mutuality of significance.
He who goes into the world with the Gospel of Christ need never fear that
what he takes is not already in positive relation to the religious meanings
he encounters, however much he himself may fail in serving that relation.
Nor, in the same world as God, need we ever lose heart.
A hopeful attitude, then, even despite the legacies and precedents
of the past is not only our first need but our proper right. No implication
is meant here against the massive loyalty and dogged erudition with which
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the great Muslim-Christian controversy in earlier centuries was served.
Every generation owes much to its position in the sequence and none has
right to graceless reproach of those that went before. Our debt to past
controversialists is immense -- and not only for the lessons of mistakes.
Moreover, Islam itself has been transformed and the visage of much of
Islam today differs profoundly from that which scorned Henry Martyn’s
mission or expressed itself in Ibn Hazm. If we are to be rightly critical of the
history of Muslim-Christian controversy we must be rightly grateful for
what by its painstaking it exempts us from, for what by its concentrations
it frees us for.
No attempt is to be made here to examine in detail the course
or content of that long controversy. I hope I am interpreting aright your
wishes in trying to concentrate on the contemporary scene. But a few
general remarks on the historical may perhaps be made as a prelude to our
main concern. The story itself has been well traced by Harry Dorman in
his doctoral study at Columbia Towards Understanding Islam. Professor
Sweetman’s volumes, especially the third in the series Islam and Christian
Theology, offer a wealth of detail on the themes and pre-occupations of
Christian writers and polemicists vis-a-vis Islam from John of Damascus,
through Ricoldo of Monte Crucis and Ramon Lull. More recently,
Gottfried Pfander’s monumental Balance of Truth is still available, the
number of its editions bearing witness to its esteem.
But through all these classic exponents of the Christian controversy
with Islam, -- in Abu Qurra, Al-Kindl, Peter the Venerable and Nicholas
of Gusa -- we find recurring patterns of argument that dominate the course
of thought. And the Muslim reaction, though it varies in tone profoundly,
as between Ibn Hazm for example and Al-Ghazali, revolves around the
business of reciprocating defense and is not really sent self-critically into
the heart of its own inward heritage. It is provoked, or inspired, to find
Muslim resources for Christian antagonism, but rarely Muslim reasons for
Christian openness. It is these latter surely that we must seek to explore
as they lie latent in such thoughts as those of Malek Bennabi, and other
Muslim self-expression to which we shall turn below.
The classic Christian controversy seems, however, to have left the
Muslim much as he was inwardly and more vigilant outwardly. There
are three important characteristics of the great controversy which may
perhaps be noted: its scriptural pre-occupation, its comparative history
and its metaphysical abstraction. The word ‘scriptural’ is purposely used
here with a small ‘ s’ to indicate the competitive authorities of recorded
revelation. There is a clash of the Biblical and the Quranic. Pfander, to take
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a late example, explores what should be the criteria of the true revelation,
then finds them vindicated ideally in the Bible and dismally unvindicated
in the Quran. Henry Martyn ventures on a similar argument. The very
earliest writers on the Christian side emphasize the prophetic fulfillment
of the Bible and the lack of prophecy for Muhammad. Rarely does the
discussion penetrate into the basic issue of the appropriateness of the
auricular revelation of Muhammad’s experience over against the concept
of personality as the supremely proper vehicle of the self-disclosure
of God. Rather the disputants assert the authority of their traditional
volumes and when their claims are returned in kind, they develop more
and more acumen in discovering flaws in the other’s book or rebuffing
allegations which their own provocation has done something to sharpen.
Was it not in part the form of Christian controversy over Muhammad as
the non-prophesied Prophet which engendered the complicating Muslim
habit of searching curiously for Biblical precedents and parallels for the
Arabian founder of Islam? It is true that certain features of the Islamic
notion of the inter-relatedness of Taurah, Zabür and Injïl explains this in
part. But much of the liability of this kind of discussion, still with us in
the Ahmadiyyah movement, we owe to the ineptitude of much Christian
custodianship of Biblical faith.
Then there was the instinctive comparison of histories,
touching to the quick the Muslim susceptibilities about the nature of
Muhammad and his role in history, sacred and mundane. All too often
those comparisons gravitated to the least important areas having to do
with wars and marriages, more than anything else. Not that these do not
have their place. The trouble was that they tended to monopolize debate
and so to obscure the deeper questions of which they formed only part.
Muhammad was taken to task, at once too much and too little, castigated
on the one side and so in turn vindicated on the other by criteria that had
not plumbed the depths of their duties to the absolutes of every age. At its
worst this kind of controversy provoked Muslims into wild and sometimes
irrelevant discussions of western patterns of sexual behavior, or at other
times it stimulated certain Muslim minds to condemn as weakness, or even
effeminacy, the qualities of the Jesus of the Gospels. When this happened
Muslims had been carried far from the traditional veneration for Jesus
which, looking upon Him as the prince of pilgrims, or the Imam of the
homeless (Imäm al-Sä’ ihïn), did not normally associate Him with any
compromise of manliness. In this way the form of Christian controversy in
some sense contributed to the obscuring of the very Gospel picture itself,
in a way that cannot wholly be attributed to malice on the other side.
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Since all religious systems, being, as Martin Buber finely said,
molds into which the spirit of man is poured, tend to react defensively
to alternatives that present themselves aggressively. The Christian
concentration on the reprehensibility’s of Muhammad and of Muslim
history frequently evoked a self-vindicating reaction of the ‘tu quoque’ kind,
or else a hardening of alienation. Only rarely did they lead the Muslim mind
back into an examination of its own heritage. It is not without significance
that the Aljmadiyyah Movement as one of the most expressive and assertive
elements in contemporary Islam was largely generated in a context, at
Qadian, of conscious anti-Christian militancy. The areas in which it has
been ready for compromise of Muslim orthodoxy have been areas involving
a sharpened resistance to the Church, in an effort to render Islam -- even
at the price of unorthodoxy -- more independent of Christian eschatology.
It is this defensive reaction against missions which largely explains why
Mirza Ghulam re-interpreted the Quranic account of the crucifixion to
allow of Christ’s being nailed on the Cross without dying, and then buried
Him in Kashmir. In this way, his heavenly ‘rapture’ was eliminated and
Islam is emancipated- from any further expectation vis-a-vis Christ. Is this
way, it would appear, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad wished to fortify a Muslim
sense of distinctiveness and self-sufficiency. But the immediate point is
that he was responding negatively to Christian mission. This is a paradox
we do well to ponder. It returns in part to that sense of menace to Islam
which Christian expression aroused when it centered itself so much on
historical controversial assessments of a delinquent Muhammad.
When this emphasis on history was extended into comparative
discussion of Muslim Empire it was always in danger of being forced into
the role of the Devil’s advocate, in the sense that it was necessary to dwell
on the sinister and unsavory aspects of historic Islam in order to prove
the point. This of course is not a situation unique to missionary writing.
Politicians have been guilty too. When Lord Cromer, for example, wrote
that “Islam reformed is Islam no longer” he coined a foolish phrase which
really meant that he wanted the essential Islam to remain the atrophied
thing he thought it was. This may have been an easy way since it obviates
the need to reckon with change and the unfamiliar. But it is entirely
inappropriate to its subject. Temple Gairdner of Cairo in his writing on
Islam was always acutely aware of this danger of seeming to want Islam at
its worst just in order to have a readier, more devastating case to make for
an alternative. He always sought to avoid it, since it invariably provokes
from the other side some form of the retort: “But this is not that: Islam
is not the thing you accuse it of being.” It is a very obvious further step
to dismiss the interpreter of the Gospel as the calumniator of Islam. Such
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is the dilemma to which an over-controversial historical pre-occupation
seems often led.
An undue confidence in metaphysical debate was the third
point in our analysis. This need hardly be illustrated here. One can find
documented in Sweetman with more fullness than one can readily digest
the Christological niceties and minutiae of Muslim-Christian controversy.
Doubtless numerous factors made for this. But alike in Ramon Lull and
Henry Martyn we find this -- to us -- strange confidence in the power
of dialectic, this excessively logical and terminological approach. When
perpetuated into our times it sets many inter Muslim-Christian themes in
areas where they have no meaning for the average devotee on either side,
or in realms that are abstrusely remote from the business of the new social
and national context.
Yet having assessed the classic exposition of Christian truth for
Muslims as unduly ‘scriptural,’ historical and ontological, in the senses
indicated, we must beware the impression that these areas of meeting are
dispensable or avoidable. When Professor Christy Wilson, in his Christian
Message to Islam a few years ago, wrote that the whole Muslim-Christian
controversy had passed into the limbo of forgotten things, he surely
overstated the case. It is not so much Whither controversy?, since the Gospel
in the profoundest sense is always controversial. The question is perhaps
rather Whither controversy? or How? and Whence? It may be said that the
most ultimately controversial is never provocatively so. The controversy
of Christ with the soul is not always in or through the controversy of the
Christian with the system. Yet it is through Christians, concerned about
systems, that Christ works. Here is the heart of our problem. It is no use
calling for things like Biblical realism and assuming that by a phrase we
have banished the besetting needs -- or sins -- of controversy. When the
Madras report on evangelism appealed in the Near East section for “the
winning way to the Muslim heart” and identified it as the way of witness and
the sharing of experience it was profoundly right. But the accompanying
implication that thereby all sharpness of issue could be eliminated was
mistaken. We may rightly desire to escape Christological subtleties as an
exercise in scholasticism. But personal witness to God in Christ cannot be
sincere without also being doctrinal. This then is the inescapability, and yet
the liability, of the controversial. How to transmit, without compromising
the mood of hospitality without which no transmission is likely, how to
join issues without separating contact, how to be adequately Christian in
terms both of truth and love: these are our needs.
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We are of course seeking in these paragraphs a valid contemporary
form of Muslim-Christian meeting. We are doing so in implicit recognition
that only the Holy Spirit guides and only by His wisdom is ours not
foolishness. But the Apostles themselves wrote on one occasion about
matters seeming “good to the Holy Ghost and us.” We should not pretend
to that claim but at least the apostolic precedent for it encourages the
belief that the Holy Spirit may be working in the instrumental thinking
of such as we are, provided we are humble enough to be just instrumental.
Such at any rate must be the aspiration in all such discussion as we are
engaged on here. In that understanding let’s turn to the present, fortified
as we are by the long and probing lessons of many precedents.
Back for a moment to Malek Bennabi and his ‘converted’ charcoal
seller. Must we not strive to address our ministry to felt needs within Islam
and to deepening their feltness? Can we leave aside for the moment the
question whether ‘conversion’ has to be patterned as we know it in Christ,
through the Cross and unto the Church, and gratefully explore with any
Muslims who will join us the corollaries of men’s remaking as they see it
from the minaret and through the muezzin’s call? Let us strive to open
up the whole rich meanings of the Christian understanding of man on
the basis of where alert Muslims already find him. Let us mediate the
Christian understanding of Christ from the starting point of the Muslim
understanding of God, for there are so many points in the latter, which
argue up into the former. Indeed, how often in studying Islam does the
awakened Christian mind find itself saying in the words of Jesus: ‘Ye
believe in God, believe also in Me.’ How can we interpret the force of this
‘also’ -- the necessity of somebody like Christ to any valid sense of a good
omnipotence?
These are only a few of the queries that have to do with the vistas
opened up by a mission to Islam that begins with what Muslims already
believe and goes forward in terms of Muslim concepts -- their implications
and their corollaries, it may be inconsistencies. “Let the word of Christ,”
said St. Paul, “dwell in you richly in all wisdom.” Let the Christian message,
he surely implied, be so deeply implanted in the mind that it controls all
thinking and inspires all responses. Let it so enter into the collective body
of the faithful that it really makes a home for itself in their minds, secure
enough to be hospitable to all that need it in the context and as expressive,
by that very hospitality, as any true home is, of its inmost nature. This, in
Pauline metaphor is what we have in mind. Not, that is, to think of the
Christian mission as going out to do battle, but going out to take in guests,
to give itself and so its message in a genuine openness to all the aspirations
and dilemmas of the world, not holding them indubiety because they start
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outside the Church, but ripening them by ministry to the maturity of their
promise.
We will not stay here to discuss the agencies through which
this can be done, the institutions, publications, forms, through which
this hospitably dwelling word of Christ in us invites men to its wealth
of wisdom. In the end all those means turn on persons, people in whose
hearts Christ Himself has taken up His abode. Instead our duty here in
the time that remains is simply to try to illustrate a few out of many central
ideas in contemporary Islam in terms of which we may hope that “the
word of Christ might dwell in us richly.”
Let us take first what we will risk here calling the problem of
evil, not however in the sense of a theological discussion as to its origin,
nor yet a theodicy in face of it, still less an evaluation of human freedom
and Divine responsibility. Rather take the problem of evil as a dilemma
of the new Muslim societies. May not some people come into a sense of
the wrongness of the soul through the wrongness of the soul through the
wrongness of society? The second at least is a phenomenon that events and
thoughts in some circles in Islam are making paramount. Consider for a
moment the obvious fact of new political self-responsibility through most
of the Muslim world. This development is a feature of our own generation
too familiar to require elaboration. But notice how, for the thinking person,
the new independence is obliged to turn the human giagnosis inward. The
old external alibis are no longer convincing. It is true that some features of
the Pakistani or the Egyptian or the Indonesian scene may still be blamed
on the lengthening entail of British or Dutch occupation. A balanced view
of imperialism is not something to be looked for in the present mood
of self-awareness. But the range and validity of these alibis are steadily
diminished as the years recede. Not only independence but wrongness
is more and more seen to be one’s own. The negative cast of mind, the
external militancy necessary to oust the foreigner, these must gradually
give way to self-constructiveness. The transference is not easy. But all that
is necessary for our point here is that it has to be made. The more people
become responsible for themselves the more the minds of their thinkers
are confronted by the puzzles of their human nature – puzzles which were
formerly veiled in measure because the inclusive diagnosis of the ills about
men went indubitably and unerringly to the foreigner. The problem of evil
is now a more domestic problem. Moreover, it is one which Islam in its
new recovery of destiny believes itself not only competent, but designed,
to solve.
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So it is that we see religious ideology in measure underlying new
movements of social reform sustained by the new nationalisms. It is true
that in most Muslim countries the forces in power are not representative
of conservative Islam. But they are surely in temper and intention deeply
Muslim. The Egyptian Regime offers the most obvious and instructive
example. It is dealing in effect with the problem of evil -- the evil of
debauched monarchy, of corrupt politics, of social injustice and inequality,
of national compromise with selfishness. Hence its internal revolution,
while inspired in measure by Quranic concepts, is also deeply concerned
about one sorry aspect of the earlier ‘evil’ in Egypt, namely its tolerance
of a state of gross self-interest that led directly to the Arab defeat in the
Palestine War of 1948-49. Indeed it is just this Arab view of that Arab
debacle, as a part of the evil of its past, that underlies the impermanence
in the Arab mind of the present state of truce. Israel, so to speak, bettered
itself territorially and now wants to perpetuate that advantage, -- all as
a concomitant of a tragic Arab political compromise of the true virtues
of Islam. However this may seem to us, it is the way the Arabs see it.
Palestine becomes a kind of symbol of what ought not to have been, not
simply in the sense that peoples ought not to get defeated, but that they
should not have gone into it already self-defeated by their own wrongness.
So the problem of evil is real to the thinking Arab in the Near East, even
if he passionately merges the one awareness with the other antipathy to
Israel, into whose hands the deeper maladies actually played. But how
many peoples before in history have always been able to distinguish clearly
between the occasions of their failure and its causes?
Internally, then, and externally, this problem of why men are what
they are, themselves their own worst foes, is present or latent in many
Muslim minds. Nor is it a theory that is wanted but a remedy. It is worth
pausing to remark that the problem of evil is all the entire sharper in
a system like Islam which believes in the givenness of the good. Men’s
recalcitrance cannot be credited to ignorance. For the perfect revelation
is in hand. Nor does exhortation to the revelation provide the answer, for
such exhortation goes on all the time. The mystery is man’ s competence
to ignore it. His recalcitrance is recalcitrance, not weakness or ignorance.
And how does this non-submission, this non-Islam, this won’t-power, this
insubordination, relate itself to God, who is presumably deified, at least by
implication, when the law of which He is the source, is flouted? Here are
doors wide open to the Christian meanings of redemption, insofar as the
word of Christ dwells in us sensitively.
Glance sometime at Abd al-Nàsir’ s little book Falsafat-al-Thaurah
(English translation: “Egypt’s Liberation.”) He refers there eloquently ‘ to

70 | 3rd Biennial Meeting (1956)

the need of a remaking of human nature, beyond a change of political
regime. What he sought for, he writes, on the morrow of the revolution was
for a single Egyptian who was not asserting his ‘I’ and scheming to make
personal advantage out of the new occasion. But how does one come by
these new men? How does one inject into the body social the inestimable
benefit of disinterested unselfish souls, the stuff of national recovery and
the sinew of social action? These are the questions to which the Church
must speak, and speak as it must in the assurance that what it has to say is
not a depredatory thing against which Islam does well to be guarded, but
a meaning central to man’s deepest hopes.
How, again, does one properly correct a situation like that of Israel
as the Arab sees it? How does one react to the sense of being wronged?
With destructive recrimination in which one also involves and blights
oneself ? Or with a recognition that only good, positive good, casts out evil,
and only love builds and redeems? “Can Satan cast out Satan” is perhaps
the profoundest of the Gospel sayings. To get to rights the situation as
it is in the Middle Eastern world is infinitely costly because it cannot be
repaired without its acceptance as it is. It is just this costliness of setting
the world to rights which the Cross so eloquently proclaims, not as some
arbitrarily constructed scheme of atonement, but as the central and
inclusive expression of the forgivingness that assures forgiveness. So in
being lifted up Christ draws all men unto Himself, gathers into His own
passion the clue and the cost of their redemption. I do not suggest that
all men can see this, now or soon. Still less that the Arab world is poised
for a great act of magnanimity such as would retrieve the entail of its own
and other’s wrongs and make reconciliation a door of hope. But what we
must say is that these are the real meanings of the place where men find
themselves and that this is what Christ says to their situation. This is the
true shape, surely, of His controversy with men. For all occasions, if only
we interpret their fullness, are schoolmasters to bring us unto Christ.
I am not, of course, suggesting here that the Western ministrant
can broach evangelism among Arab Muslims from the starting point of
co-existence with Israel. Nothing so inane. At best he will only win the
retort that as a Westerner he is anxious to see the liquidation of a situation
that troubles his conscience. At worst much else. But what is meant here is
that we must help the minds of men to think into the deepest meanings of
their own dilemmas and that as they do so they will be learning the mind
of Christ.
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Are there any signs that these dilemmas are really searched? I
think so. It is hard to know how much weight to attach to Abd al-Näsir’s
little book. But taken at its face value it goes deep into these realms of man
and evil, as all sincere political reformers must. There is some evidence also
in Arab circles of a new interest in the person of Christ and not least in the
Cross. One striking item here is the recent study by Muhaammad Kämil
Husain, a member of the Arab Academy, called Qaryah Zälimah, “City
of Wrong.” There is no time to discuss it fully here and perhaps no need
since a contributor to the April and July issues of The Muslin World, 1956,
has analyzed it carefully. Let me simply add that the orthodox view of the
Quran on the Cross not only allows but requires the antagonism of the
Jews to Jesus, which willed He should be crucified. What it disallows is the
consummation of that purpose, which God thwarted by having the Jews
crucify mistakenly a likeness to Jesus, while He escaped from the Garden
to Heaven but the Passion, so to speak, up to Gethsemane, is all there,
even in the Quranic denial that Jesus was crucified. He was at least One
whom men intended to crucify. Even Abbäs al Aqqäd in his 1952 study
on “The Genius of Christ” referred to the opposition suffered by Jesus as
the bitterest accorded to any Prophet. So Muhammad Husain finds in the
passions and reasoning’s of Jews, and Romans, culminating in the sentence
against Jesus, an index to the wrongness of humanity. These sins, he says,
are re-committed day by day across the world. They were not isolated
or confined to Jews and Romans. Indeed that Friday when Jesus was
sentenced to suffer, men willed to crucify the conscience of mankind. Let
me commend to you this book, as one of the most penetrating expressions
of Muslim openness to the meaning of the Gospel that I have ever
encountered. Nowhere of course does the author explicitly state that the
Cross happened. But all that he writes is destined to shattering anti-climax
unless he is prepared to concede that there was a self -offering of Jesus in
a situation of contradiction (as Hebrews calls it) whereby men are shown
to themselves for what they are. Surely to grasp this truth of the Cross as
an index to humanity is to be on the way to a sense of its meaning as an
index to God. One has only to pass beyond Jesus teaching by what He said
(so as to arouse the enmity that made the Cross) to Jesus teaching by what
He did with that enmity. Here surely the clues go together. To have seen
the one is to be on the way to the other. We may be coming to a time in
our missionary lifetime when the historicity of the Crucifixion will cease
to be merely a matter of academic debate and become a theme of genuine
understanding. If that happens we will be a long way to turning the flank
of lots of the old Christological and Trinitarian controversies. For in the
end the meaning of the Trinity is that God cares enough to redeem.
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There is perhaps space for one other, somewhat different
illustration of how we may search for a new and active Muslim awareness
of what is distinctive in Christianity -- the sort of awareness that stays
to ponder before it moves to disprove. Let me refer briefly to the basic
Muslim concept of Shirk on which I ventured to write in a short discussion
in the January issue of The Muslim World (to which I refer only to excuse
the present brevity). Shirk as you remember is the deadly sin of association
with God, the associating, rather, of anything with God so that it receives
worship, attributes, functions, or ascriptions proper only to the One God.
Shirk is the antithesis of Tauhïd. The One God is militantly so, intolerant
of all usurpation, implied or actual, of His uniqueness. It may take many
forms, but the one most popularly in mind when the term is used is of
course idolatry, or plurality of deities. It is under the invalidity of Shirk that
Islam condemns the Christian faith in the Divinity of Christ. It reprobates
the classic Christian doctrine as a piece of idolatry it was designed to
destroy. Yet nothing could be more polar in its contrast than idolatry is
from Christology properly understood.
This business of association, as the Quran forbids it, is of course,
association by men with God. It is deifying it deplores, it does not (though
the average Muslim does not stay to think this out)-- it does not exclude
an association which the Divine wills with some human place, agent or
time. Indeed revelation and religion alike would be impossible if God
had no access to, no instrumentalities in, the world of men. Islam itself
has many such loci of the Divine action – Muhammad and Mecca in
particular. These are the focal points, historically and geographically, of a
Divine enterprise of revelation. In pilgrimage the Muslim comes to greet
them both and says as he does so: “Here I am O God before Thee.” In this
revelatory sense the Divine is emphatically ‘associated’ with the human,
though not of course so as to make the human Divine. But the human
is certainly caught up into the counsels and intent of the Divine. Now
of course the Christian understanding of Christ arises in just this realm
of the Divine action. The great difference is that there are certain Divine
purposes which the faith understands to be so rich and real that only God
can truly undertake them. They are incapable of delegation. It takes God,
we say, to reveal God, so when God is revealed it is God also Who is
revealing. Man’s redemption, being a deed of love such as only God has,
must necessarily be God’s deed. The crowning of prophetic revelation in
the Son, the crowning of the Divine Compassion in the Cross, these are
tasks so tremendous as to be inalienably Divine, both in their concept
and their doing. So properly seen, the Christian understanding of Christ
is not a part or an instance of the Shirk Islam decries, but a part -- the
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instance -- of that Divine involvement in the human which the Quran
posits only through tanzïl to the Prophet. Christian faith about Christ is
not deification. The direction is all the other way. Essential man is not
made God by human superstition. The Word is made flesh. We on our
side are recognizing a Divine involvement in our world that is inalienably
Divine precisely because in its Self-giving it has no limits that withhold it.
Islam in effect ‘withholds’ God from such totality of involvement
and does so in the interests of what it understands to be the Divine
transcendence. But the Divine coming is no compromise of the Divine
majesty, so long as it is Self-willed and so long as one obeys Divine, and
not human, criteria, of what is fitting to God. These reflections merge into
many more themes upon which there is no space here to enlarge: how
the Divine prerogative of forgiveness, in which Islam believes, should be
conceived to be at work: how the Rahmän becomes the Rahïm, how the
revelation of a sovereign law involves the action of a sovereign grace, unless
evil is to leave us with an unresolved dichotomy. There is also the question
whether idolatry, which errs mathematically, is as heinous a form of Shirk,
as men’s defiance, which errs morally. Men who make themselves, their
systems or their races, into ultimate’s do more to flout the Oneness of
God in ways that matter than does the simple pagan, who often multiplies
deities out of a sense either of worshipfulness or fear.
But these questions we must leave. My purpose in raising the query
about Shirk is simply that I feel a proper understanding of what it does, and
what it cannot, mean helps to pave the way for a Muslim understanding
of Christ from within his own sense of Divine sovereignty and activity
towards man. There are signs in some quarters both in the Arab world and
Pakistan that Muslims themselves are aware of the deep significance of the
Muslim idea of Shirk as something much more inclusive than anti-idolatry
in its Arabian form. Indeed they say there are conceivably senses in which
even Islam itself in some forms is a kind of Shirk, if and when nomocracy,
or community, or Islam for its own sake, usurp the role that only God
should play in the lives of His creatures. But all that I mean to say here
is that the more Muslims explore the feasible connotations of this most
basic of all Muslim concepts, the further they will get from devalidating
Christianity on such score. And positively, they may learn the Christian
form of that Divine human inter-relatedness without which all religion
would be farce and fantasy.
Many thanks for your patience. I do wish a more normal situation
allowed me to be with you. The foregoing is a poor gesture towards a vast
problem, but as long as men are men and Muslims are Muslims and Christ
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is Christ we’ll be putting our minds and wills to these themes. God be
with you.

